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Abstract
There are high economic expectations regarding the emergence of Big Data: a
promised golden age for both consumers and rms. Digital technology allows rms
to provide digital services in exchange of personal data, from which they can ne-
tune their supply to better match market demand. By extending Arrow (1962)'s
analysis of the market for information to the phenomenon of Big Data, we propose
a theoretical assessment of its potential eects on productivity growth. Our study
highlights that Big Data modify the market for information by introducing a new
informational product, based on personal data, which is not a legally disseminable
public good. This characteristic is crucial as it implies that private production of
personal-data based information can be protable. This protability gives digital
rms the incentive to produce information likely to improve rm-level productivity
and consumer welfare. Finally, we conclude that the productivity eect of Big Data
at the macroeconomic level is conditional on the returns of both the production and
diusion of this personal-data based information.
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1 Introduction
The volume of data created every year in the world started to increase sharply with
the arrival of the personal computer but has stepped up considerably the pace with the
Internet, the sensor and the mobile phone (Lyman & Varian 2003). This proliferation
of data has been made possible by three technological innovations: processing, storage,
and information and communication technologies. These innovations have changed our
professional and free time activities in a convergent way. Most of our acts now proceed
through screens and hard disks in white- and blue-collar jobs as well as in our recreational
moments. These new work and playful tools are also new media through which all our
acts are inexorably "datacated". Digitalization necessarily implies the production of data
in unprecedented quantity, systematically stored in the new magnetic and optical media.
This massive creation of digital footprints is not only stored at low cost but also cheaply
transmitted electronically through communication technology (telephone, radio and TV,
and the Internet). The "datacation" of almost everything, the rapid electronic transmis-
sion and the interconnection of all these data characterize this technological phenomenon
called \Big Data".1
There are high expectations of Big Data in science2, public administration and, partic-
ularly, in business3. Some consider data as a new raw material or even a new class of
assets, i.e. goods capable of generating and storing economic value (The Economist (2010)
and Schwab et al. (2011)). Many expect lower prices for consumers thank to ubiquitous
competition, better-informed decisions for enterprises thank to data analysis, and more
income growth and jobs at the macroeconomic level thank to higher productive eciency.
Are these high expectations misplaced? Will Big Data deliver its promise of productiv-
ity growth? This paper attempts to answer these questions by extending the theoretical
analysis of the market for information by Arrow (1962) to an important segment of the
Big Data phenomenon: the production of personal digital footprints by digital users and
their exploitation by providers of digital services. What do Big Personal Data change
to the market for information? Our theoretical exploration concludes that Big Personal
Data modify this market by allowing digital rms to make prots by extracting valuable
information from personal data that consumers accept to transfer in exchange of the use
of a free or paid digital service. Data protection laws4 prohibit passing on personal data
to the public arena. This legal bulwark against privacy violations not only protects the
users of the Internet and other digital networks but also safeguards the digital rms'
prots. Privacy indeed distinguishes personal information from information in general.
1See Chen et al. (2014) for a survey and Boyd & Crawford (2012) for a critical analysis of this
phenomenon.
2Scientic knowledge is expected to benet a lot from massive data production and processing in
natural and engineering sciences (see, for instance, Feigelson & Babu (2012) and Marx (2013)) as well as
in social sciences like economics (Einav & Levin (2013), Einav & Levin (2014), Taylor et al. (2014)).
3See, for instance, Manyika et al. (2011) and Lohr (2012).
4For an overview of data protection laws in the world see the website:
www.dlapiperdataprotection.com.
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The protection against the public dissemination of personal information is thus the guar-
antee for digital rms to appropriate the economic value they create from our personal
data. If personal information were not protected, it could diuse easily and costlessly as
any other type of information and producers of information would not make any prot.
Big Personal Data are therefore a game-changing technological innovation in the market
for information. Digital technology allows to acquire countless personal data that each
individual would communicate to only, if at all, a few trustworthy people. By making
possible to capture prot from the production of personal information, Big Personal Data
provide digital rms with big incentives to produce new market information based on
personal data. The quality of market information should increase and so does corporate
eciency thank to better-informed management. However, most rms will have to pay
for such personal-data based information or live without it. At the macroeconomic level,
data-based management of rms should lift up aggregate productivity provided that the
production of personal-data based market information is not a monopolistic rent of a
handful of digital giants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides denitions of data, infor-
mation and Big Data. Section 3 explains the characteristics of the market for information.
Section 4 presents what the emergence of Big Data change to the market for information.
Section 5 deals with the potential macroeconomic eects of Big Data. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data, Information and Big Data
This section aims at providing denitions of data, information and Big Data. Denitions
vary in the literature. In this paper, we will use the following denitions:
What are data? Data can be dened as distinguishable variables with no meaning per
se. Floridi (2010) talks about data as \lacks of uniformity" in the real world, between two
signals or two symbols. He takes the example of a red light against a dark background.
This is a datum in the\real world"breaking uniformity with the dark background without
a self-imposing intelligibility. Silence amidst the noise is also a datum as lack of uniformity.
Data can be stored as continuous variables (analogue data) or as discrete variables (digital
data). In fact, digital data are a particular case among discrete variables: they are binary
variables. As is well-known, digital data are aggregates of bits (binary digits) of 0 and 1.
This means that all digital data use the same lexicon composed of only two signs (bits
represented by two gures 0 and 1) but dier in their number of signs and in the order
of these signs (syntax). This two-sign lexicon has made possible to store in the same way
a sound, an image or a text. The universality of the digital technology has allowed to
digitalize the storage of many data, i.e. the transformation of analogue data into digital
data.
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What is information? Anyone with no computer knowledge looking at a computer
programme may nd it meaningless or unintelligible. Yet data in the computer programme
are assembled by its designer to be meaningful. Data become informative when data in
our environment produce a meaningful signal or when we associate a semantic content to
these data (Floridi 2010). In other words, information can be dened as data + meaning.
Then, knowledge emerges from the accumulation of information. In the terminology of
Floridi (2010), knowledge builds up from factual semantic information, which implies that
the semantic content associated to data has proved to be true.
What are Big Data? There are countless denitions of Big Data and most of them
stress the size and the exponential growth of data we have been observing in the re-
cent past. Floridi (2012) points out the tautology in dening Big Data by their size.
Nevertheless, the high volume of production is indisputably a characteristic of Big Data.
Two other characteristics are generally put forward (Laney 2001): high velocity of data
production but also of data expiration; and variety of data (structured, unstructured,
text and multimedia data). This 3V's denition of Big Data is not operational for our
theoretical analysis. In this paper, we will dene Big Data as mainly the production of
personal data and information, i.e. Big Personal Data. This characteristics distinguishes
data and information before and after the digital technology. Digital technology provides
a technical way to oer services at a distance, which requires the transfer and storage of
personal data to connect people and connect people with goods and services. By using
these digital services, we leave additional digital footprints of our personality. Anytime
we use a digital media, we tacitly accept to transfer personal data on a server, which
raises major heatedly debated privacy concerns (Solove 2004). The massive production of
personal data resulting from the use of digital services characterizes the singularity and
the novelty of the era of Big Data.
3 The Economic Value of Information
3.1 Conditions for a Social Welfare Optimum in a Market Econ-
omy
Let us start with an example to highlight the determinants and the pitfalls of the market
for information. Imagine Sarah, an ice-cream seller, owning her ice-cream parlor in a
holiday resort where the weather is very changeable. Since the weather is uncertain, she
would like to hire less sta on rainy days and hire more on sunny days to maximize her
prot. Suppose that, due to labor regulations, she has to make hiring decisions at least two
days ahead of time and in a context where there is no scientic meteorological knowledge to
make weather forecasts fairly accurately. The absence of weather forecasting information
creates uncertainty for her, which will surely result in erroneous hiring decisions with
negative consequences on her prot. Knowing weather forecasts would solve her planning
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problem, maximize her prot and reduce the ice-cream price in a competitive ice-cream
market. The producer and the consumer surpluses would be higher. The weather forecast
is thus valuable information but it does not exist. Suppose now that a businessman spends
a lot of money investing in meteorological research and development to produce seven-
day weather forecasts with a good level of accuracy. Weather is still uncertain but now
predictable thank to his technological innovation. Assume also that the businessman is a
monopolist and, hence, a price maker. There is a potential market demand for weather
forecasting information since all the ice-cream sellers, at least, would be interested in
buying it. The question is what the market price for weather forecasts will be. If the
businessman succeeds in selling his weather forecasts to Sarah, she will disclose them to
the extra waiters simply by informing them whether they are hired or not the forthcoming
days. The relatives and friends of these waiters will consequently be informed about their
schedule the next days thus diusing the forecasting information at no cost. Sarah's
nearby competitors could also have a chance to get informed without paying a penny.
The weather forecasting information would keep on diusing informally at no cost. The
following incentive mechanism is in order: Sarah, the only person bearing the cost of the
weather forecasts, will probably soon stop purchasing them driving their price down to
zero; the businessman will stop spending on research because there is no market return to
cover the cost of his inventing activity. Paradoxically, weather information is valuable for
all ice-cream sellers and yet this potential high market demand does not turn into many
buyers and a high price for the monopolist. How to explain this nonoptimal allocation of
resources to information?
General equilibrium theory - the framework of neoclassical economics - provides the condi-
tions under which a society can achieve a social welfare optimum when supply, demand and
price levels are determined without centralized decision-making (Arrow & Hahn (1971)
and Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). Among these conditions, perfect competition is the most
well-known. There are three generally observed reasons why perfect competition fails to
achieve a socially optimal allocation of resources: indivisibilities, inappropriability and
uncertainty. Indivisibilities occur when it is not protable to produce goods under a min-
imum scale due to xed costs. When this happens, free entry of new enterprises in such a
market - a condition for perfect competition - fails and the resource allocation is nonopti-
mal. Inappropriability describes the situation in which prots from the private production
of a good cannot be fully captured by the producer. Public goods are subject to this fail-
ure because several people can consume the good at the same time (non-rivalry) and
because it is dicult to prevent those people from consuming the good without producing
it themselves (non-excludability). An example of such a good is information, which can
be costly to produce, used by its producer and some others simultaneously, and arduous
or even impossible to avert its disclosure. There is thus no incentive for any private pro-
duction of this good and the resource allocation under perfect competition is inevitably
nonoptimal. Uncertainty refers to incomplete information. Information may be incom-
plete because existing information is known to some and unknown to others (asymmetric
information) or because not yet existing information is unknown to all (future informa-
tion). When uncertainty is introduced in the general equilibrium framework, the socially
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optimal resource allocation gives way because individual preferences are assumed to have
a concave form (i.e., people enjoy consuming more of a good but grow weary of it each
time they consume an additional quantity). In an uncertain environment, the concavity
assumption of the utility function means that individuals are risk-averse. The result is
that they will invest less in risky activities than the social optimum requires. Although
they could buy contracts to be insured against these risks, they could not do it for any
type of risk because the insurance market is incomplete due to moral hazard.5
3.2 Information Market: Optimal Use and Nonoptimal Produc-
tion of Information
In a celebrated paper, the American economist Arrow (1962) explains why these three
motives - indivisibilities, inappropriability and uncertainty - create a market for informa-
tion whose production is socially nonoptimal. First, he argues that uncertainty creates an
economic value for information. When information is incomplete because existing informa-
tion is not known to everybody, the utility or prots of the individuals who do not possess
such information may be negatively aected due to uninformed decisions. Knowing such
information reduces uncertainty and increases these individuals' welfare by replacing un-
informed by well-informed decisions. This economic value of information gives rise to a
market for existing information, in which individuals who ignore a piece of information
are willing to acquire it from individuals who know it. Optimality of allocation requires
that the price of this piece of information equals its marginal cost, i.e. its diusion cost
since the product on sale is existing information. Nowadays, the diusion technology is
universal, fast and cheap thank to our modern information and communication technol-
ogy. Therefore, the marginal cost should be close to zero. Can marginal cost pricing be
applied to the market for existing information? It cannot because of indivisibilities and
inappropriability, two reasons at the origin of nonoptimal allocation of resources. This is
the second point of Arrow. Information is an indivisible commodity. Either one knows it
or does not. Moreover, as already mentioned, information is a non-rival commodity which
can be diused easily and at low cost. The owner of the piece of information has therefore
no incentive to sell it and may prefer to keep it for herself. Nevertheless, information is
also hardly excludable, which implies that any information, as soon as it is used, has a
high probability of leaking and becoming public. This is good news for the optimality of
use of information. Although indivisibilities and inappropriability are obstacles to optimal
allocation of resources through marginal cost pricing, inappropriability leads to the social
optimum all the same thank to the non-excludability of information and the cheap cost
of its diusion technology. This reduces the incompleteness of information for all and
increases social welfare thank to more well-informed decisions.
5If an entrepreneur can sign an insurance contract, which covers the risk of the commercial failure
of his new product completely, he will not have the incentive to provide the maximum eort to make it
a commercial success. Due to this presence of moral hazard, no insurance company will accept to fully
insure this entrepreneur.
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However, what is a virtue for the use of information is a vice for the production of
information. In his third point, Arrow explains that inappropriability, which pushes prices
down to zero, now is a serious brake to the production of knowledge, i.e. the production
of information or new ideas. On the market for existing information, the cost is limited to
the cost of diusion. On the market for the production of information, the cost includes
not only the diusion cost but also the cost of research to produce new information.
Moreover, this production is an uncertain process. There is no guarantee that research
will yield useful and protable knowledge. If the producer of information has no guarantee
to retain the benets of its costly and successful research, he will never allocate resources
to research in the rst place. Arrow concludes that indivisibilities, inappropriability and
uncertainty lead to a suboptimal amount of resources allocated to invention activity.
In a market economy, optimal production of information and optimal use of information
are incompatible. On the one hand, optimal use of information requires a price close to
zero, which would result in zero production of information. On the other hand, optimal
production of information requires a return high enough to cover the research and devel-
opment cost, which is best reached by not diusing the produced information leading to a
nonoptimal use of information. In order to solve this dilemma, the institutional solution
(centralized decision making) that has been found grants legal protection (patents, copy-
rights, ...) to the inventors, providing partial excludability of information and royalties to
the inventors. This solution aims at combining the creation of rewards for the production
of information and its wide diusion for an optimal use of it. The system is not perfect
but allows to get out from the incentive trap of the market for information.
4 What do Big Data Change to the Market for In-
formation?
4.1 Less Asymmetric Information
Recall Sarah, the owner of an ice-cream parlour in a holiday resort. Imagine her going
shopping before the Internet to buy clothes. She enters many shops, talks with the
shopkeepers, tries on clothes, compares the quality, the style and the prices of the items,
ends up making a choice and pays for her purchases. Then, she meets her friends for a
drink and shares her feelings about the clothes she saw and bought and the shops she
visited. It took time for Sarah to visit the clothing shops, even though they might be
located near to one another, nd clothes she would like to wear and compare prices. Most
probably, she missed items she would have liked to buy and cheaper ones she already
bought in more expensive shops. Nevertheless, she made her best to nd the clothes
she wants to wear at the lowest prices conditional on information she had at the time of
making her purchases. On the supply side of this market, the shopkeepers made their
best to infer information about Sarah in a very short span of time to meet her demand
and conclude the sales. But they do not have tangible data to make up that information.
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They do not know her precise age, her family status, her job, her friends and relatives
and her true preferences. Asking by the shopkeepers for these data would have been
a violation of her privacy. This lack of information, or more precisely, the presence of
asymmetric information on both sides of the market probably resulted in an imperfect
match between the supply of the shops and the demand of Sarah. These data exist but
are not symmetrically shared by both sides of the market.
A decade later, Sarah wants to buy new clothes but can now go shopping online thank to
the arrival of the Internet. She enters in a search engine the product names, the brand
names and the store names she is interested in. When she has selected the items she
would like to buy, she can use a price comparison website to nd the store oering the
lowest price and look for customer reviews on the items and the stores. If Sarah wants
to make the purchase, she has to register as a new customer to the virtual store she has
selected and enter some personal data about her such as her name, contact details and
credit card information. Then, she can write her own customer review and share her
experience and feelings in social media. All Sarah's clicks while browsing the Internet
have left digital footprints on the servers of the search engine, the shopping sites she
visited, the price comparison website, the shopping site where she made her purchase and
her comments, and the social media. Whereas the shopkeepers had to infer information
about Sarah's preferences and budget constraint from her appearance and a couple of
dialogues in the physical store, computers can exploit digital data (data analysis) left
by Sarah while browsing the Internet to infer the same type of information. The more
data Sarah leaves on the Internet, the more of them can be used to rene and check
the accuracy of information about her tastes and purchasing power constructed by the
customer proling algorithms.
This example highlights what change digital technology brings about in the market for
existing information: the acquisition and the storage of personal data. Personal informa-
tion is protected by privacy and data protection laws in many countries in the world and
cannot be legally made public. Governments possess a part of our personal data called
administrative data. Every individual must by law provide the administration with her
personal data to fulll her citizen's duties (tax payments for instance) and to enjoy civil
rights as well as social benets. These data, which used to be stored on printed paper, now
are stored on hard disks. They remain condential as in the past due to data protection
laws. Individuals and rms cannot have a legal access to these data. However, digital
technology has developed a legal access to our personal data. Each visit of a website and
every information uploaded on social media generate digital data about ourselves that can
be used by the private owners of these websites to learn more about our preferences, habits
and resources. Every time we make a click while browsing the Internet, we voluntarily
accept to transfer condential personal data to the private entities we pay a virtual visit.
These data are protected by data protection laws to some extent so that private entities
cannot make them public.6 In other words, by using the Internet, individuals freely give
6The security of the storage of personal data cannot be technically guaranteed. As shown by the
disclosures on the US National Security Agency's spying in 2013, countless telephone and internet com-
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private entities access to personal data to an unprecedented scale in history.
Big Personal Data, dened as the systematic digital storage of personal data, provide
private rms with large quantities of personal data, which can be converted into infor-
mation about individuals' tastes and budget constraints. Big Personal Data thus modify
the market for existing information in two ways. First, they provide massive quantities
of existing information on individuals which was not available before digital technology.
Second, thank to the universality of the Internet use, Big Personal Data provide statisti-
cal conditions to build personal information from personal data with a level of accuracy
unknown before. Moreover, it allows for correcting or updating this information on a
continuous basis. In other words, digital technology provide technical tools to reveal ex-
isting information on individuals. If enterprises master these technical tools, they can
collect massive personal data to reduce asymmetric information on their market, make
better-informed decisions and match their customers' needs more precisely.
4.2 Personal Information Is Not a Legally Disseminable Public
Good
The fundamental changes Big Data introduce in the market for information is on the
production of information. First, digital technology allows the creation of two new in-
formational products: personal information and personal-data based market information.
By accumulating data transferred by digital users, digital rms can produce personal
information for each of their customers. As already mentioned, the value of that in-
formation comes from the reduction in asymmetric information. If all digital rms are
able to produce personal information on their customers, many less can aggregate it to
produce statistically reliable information on market demand and supply and capture real-
time changes in both sides of the market. Obviously, the larger the audience of digital
rms, the more accurate the inferred market information, and the higher the value of
this informational product. Therefore, the economic value of personal-data based market
information will be dependent on the audience of users. As explained in the previous
section, information is an indivisible good: it is accurate or it is not. Therefore, only
market information produced by digital giants will be valuable. For this reason, Google
and Facebook, for example, will never charge for the use of their web sites since their
economic value relies on the size of their audience.
The second fundamental change - by far the most important one - concerns the prof-
itability of the private production of these two new informational goods. Arrow (1962)
munications in the world have been intercepted by the US administration. Many more governments
probably behave the same way in order to have access to personal data accumulated by private entities.
In general, governments including the US administration store but do not diuse the intercepted data
in the public arena. It is nevertheless a real threat for companies and individuals as exemplied by the
disclosure of many sensitive documents of Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014. The US administra-
tion suspects the North Korean government as the mastermind behind the hacking of the US company's
servers and the diusion of condential data in the public arena.
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showed that information as a public good could not yield a sucient return to cover the
investment cost of its producer. But the two new informational products introduced by
the Big Personal Data phenomenon are not standard public goods. The rst one - per-
sonal information - is a public good but cannot be disseminated, in principle, because
the diusion of personal data is prohibited by law.7 The private producers of personal
information can assist enterprises to target consumers and better match their demand.
The second one - personal-data based market information - is a public good but can be
very demand-specic. This informational product is an aggregate of personal information
on a specic market. Its accuracy depends on the size of the audience of the producer of
personal information. Digital giants have a denite comparative advantage in this market.
Although the dissemination of this informational product is legally possible, their private
producers can tailor it to the specic needs of each rm as well as sell market informa-
tion to some rms rst. Thus, thank to protected personal data, private producers of
personal-data based information can condently capture the returns on their investment.
As a result, the market for information based on personal data escapes the incentive trap
which characterizes the market for general information.
5 Will Big Data Deliver its Promised Productivity
Growth?
As mentioned earlier, Arrow (1962) concluded that the market for information as a public
good would lead to a suboptimal investment in the production of knowledge (i.e. factual
semantic information Floridi (2010)), hence yielding lower productivity growth than its
optimal trend. In order to correct this market failure in the information market, Arrow
advocated for a legal framework protecting the economic return of information producers
by granting them intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights) while fostering
unlimited fair competition in the market for tangible goods and services. The competition
policy framework in the western world has relied on the recognition of these two dimensions
of many products: the idea and the physical product. Competition is the rule for the
production of the physical good or service by any enterprise abiding by the patents and
copyrights while the producer of the idea benets from an exception to this rule by
receiving a guaranteed return to his invention. This regulation system is not perfect
but has found a subtle balance to provide the right incentives to inventors (producers
of knowledge) and maximize social welfare through competitive prices on the market of
physical products. How does digital technology modify this balance?
On the consumer side, information and communication technology transforms any con-
sumer into an online ubiquitous consumer. Prior to the Internet, price comparison was
a costly and time-consuming activity. Nowadays, any web shopper can easily compare
prices of a good he wants to buy before the purchase. This transparency of the market
7Obviously, in social media websites, personal information becomes public information if the users
congure their prole accounts as public.
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supply has inevitably increased competition and, hence, lowered prices. In this respect,
social welfare has increased without destabilizing the competition regulatory balance.
On the producer side, digital technology has two main eects. First, it transforms tangible
products into intangible ones. The most famous example is the music industry. All of
a sudden, the physical dimension of a musical record vanished, transforming a rival and
excludable good into a non-rival and non-excludable one. Artists and music corporations
lost the actual property of the returns of their productions. In fact, digitalization of
tangible goods and services in an increasing number of industries threatens the existence of
businesses and jobs. Musicians and record labels have not disappeared but their revenues
have decreased substantially on average despite a record demand for now very aordable
music listening.
However, the producers have taken their revenge on the consumers by collecting and
storing personal data of the frenetic web consumers. This is the second eect of digital
technology on the production side: the emergence of Big Data. As explained in the
previous section, Big Data do not eliminate market uncertainty for rms but reduces some
of it. Some of the uninformed decisions that enterprises used to make amid the absence
of information or based on biased scattered information should now be made based on
market information statistically built from Big Data. The management of enterprises
can therefore rely more on statistical personal-data based information rather than on
uncertain anecdotal information or on the subjectivity of their managers. On average,
productivity of rms should thus increase.
The competition regulatory balance is shattered by the two eects of digitalization on the
supply side. By eliminating the physical dimension of some goods and services, digital
technology threatens the protability of private production of the digitalized goods. In
the past, competition authorities had to regulate producers to the benet of consumers.
Nowadays, consumers should be regulated to make sure that producers get even a slight
return of their production. The second eect of digital technology - the emergence of Big
Personal Data - re-balances the information market in favor of the producers, which is good
news for the industries experiencing the digital transition of their production. However,
Big Personal Data do not solve the issue, highlighted by Arrow, of the incompatibility
between the optimal production of information and the optimal use of information. Market
power just changed sides from the users to the producers. Therefore, the macroeconomic
eect of Big Data is uncertain. The competition policy framework will have to nd a new
subtle balance between the incentives for personal-based information production and its
widest possible diusion before privacy engineering technology eliminates the access to
our personal data for all digital companies, i.e. the source of their market power.8
8There is a competition policy debate about Big Data. See, for instance, Stucke & Grunes (2015).
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6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to propose an assessment of the potential eects of Big
Data on aggregate productivity. The method of analysis is inspired by Arrow (1962)'s
theoretical study of the market for information and its macroeconomic consequences.
We extend his analysis by investigating the changes digital technology brings about in
the market for information and its implications for the economy as a whole. Our main
conclusions are threefold. First, we emphasize that Big Data provide digital rms with
personal data as raw materials to produce personal information likely to improve rms'
management decisions and better match their customers' needs. Second, data protection
laws safeguard both the digital users' privacy and the digital rms' prot. If personal
data were not protected, digital users would not trust digital rms and, consequently,
would stop using their digital services to avoid transferring their personal data. It is
in the interest of digital rms not to diuse personal data because it is a condition for
getting users, producing personal information and selling personal-data based information
at a protable price. This legal protection of privacy implies that personal information
is not a legally disseminable public good. This is the reason why private production of
information based on personal data can be protable unlike general information which can
diused easily and costlessly. Finally, we argue that Big Data should benet all rms by
reducing asymmetric information. However, the eect on the economy-wide productivity
growth will depend on the level of competition prevailing in the production of personal-
data based information. If competition is too high, prices will be low and digital rms
will have no incentive to produce information. If competition is too weak, prices will be
high and many rms will not be able to aord acquiring such information. Big Data's
promised productivity growth is therefore conditional on both the production level and
quality as well as the wide diusion of this personal-data based information. If privacy
engineering technology happened to succeed in ringfencing the access to our personal data
for any digital service provider, the production and the diusion of market information
as well as production eciency would likely be impacted negatively.
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